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1. Introduction 
1n international dealings， politics and economics cannot be separated 
from each other. Besides， economics and politics mutually influence each 
other in the policy spheres. Economic policies are often tuned to 
accommodate political concerns， while political interests often lead to the 
making of important economic policies (Spero， 1977: 4). 1n fact， political 
considerations are of the utmost importance in integration mechanisms. 
“Political considerations are intimately involved both in the conception 
and in the execution of integration schemes" (Asante， 1986: 4). As the 
former President of the EEC Commission， Walter Hollstein， said:“we are 
not in business at al; we are in politics" (cited in Swann， 1975: 11). 
While the link between politics with economics is well known， the 
precise nature of this link is subject to debate. The term 'political 
economy' means many things to many theorists (Gilpin， 1987)， and there 
is no agreement as to what constitutes the core areas of political 
economy. 1t can be broadly definecl as the way the state ancl its political 
processes affect ancl， in tur・n，are affectecl by the market， in its role of 
allocation and clistribution of resources. The way political decisions and 
interstate activities influence the location of economic activities and the 
clistribution of costs and benefits are the main focus in the literatur・eon 
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the political economy of international integration. 1n this context， the 
political economy aims to analyse the political bases of economic choices 
between countries 
Governments do not generaIIy pursue policies prescribed on 
efficiency-based economic theorems， and are often driven by other 
interests. Hence， governments often implement poIicies differ官 ltto those 
based on efficiency to satisfy various pressure groups in the society. 
Accordingly， free trade， even though it may maximise economic 
efficiency for a country， isnot a politicaIIy acceptable option in the 
context of South Asia. 1n South Asia， interaction has been hamperec1 by 
decades of mutual c1istrust anc1 hostility. 
South Asian countries1 formally launchec1 its regional integration 
arrangement (R1A) caIIec1 the South Asian Association for Regional 
Cooperation in 19852 • 1n 1993 they came to the unc1erstanc1ing that 
cooperation cannot be furtherec1 unless the intra-regional economic 
relationships are strengthenec1 on a formal basis. As such the South Asian 
preferential trac1e agreement was fom1alized in 1995 to promote intra -regional 
trade in the region. However， intra-regional trac1e continues to be limitec1 
to less than 5 percent of the total South Asian trac1e anc1 has seen no 
significant boost even five years after the implementation of a formal 
preferential trac1ing agreement3 in 1995. Moc1eled on a trac1itional preferential 
trac1e agreement basec1 on European experience， South Asia now aims at 
elevating itself to higher levels of economic integration moving along the 
path of the preferential trac1ing system of the European moc1e14 • 
1 1n this paper， South Asia refers in the main， tofive major countries in th巴region:
Bangladesh， India， Nepal， Pakistan and Sl・iLanka. The importance of Bhutan and 
Maldives in terms of their economic dealings in the regional and global context is v巴ry
marginal 
2 Members of the gr勾oupare Bangladesh， Bhutan， India， Maldives， N巴pal，Pakistan 
and Sri Lanka. 
3 Movement of capital between these states is very negligible. 
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Overall objective of this paper is to analyze the political consideration 
influencing economic integration in South Asia with a view to underline 
the existence of both major impediments and opportunities for economic 
integration in South Asia. 1n particular， political factors (or non-economic 
factors) need special attention in developing countries in the process of 
formation， continuation， and strengthening of R1As (Samaratunga， 2000). 
This paper is organized as follows: At first， itoutlines the political 
economy considerations in the context of regional economic integration in 
general. Secondly analysis is done of the political constraints on the rapid 
economic integration in South Asia and finally it provides a possible 
solution to circumvent existing non-economic barriers to the promotion 
of intra…regional economic integration in South Asia. 
2. Regional Integration: Political Economy Considerations 
Coexistence and the mutual interaction of the state and market 
creates the interface for the modern political economy consiclerations 
(Gilpin， 1987). 1n the real worlcl， social clivisions have a clirect impact on 
public policies ancl， consequently， on the ways in which market forces are 
permittecl to operate. Therefore， itcannot be assumecl that there is a 
harmonious relationship between political ancl market forces. 1n the 
international arena， there has often been highly clisruptive interaction 
between politics ancl the economy， just as in the case of clomestic economics 
ancl politics 
1nteraction of politics with market forces in a particular region forms 
the core area for the stucly of the political economy aspects of regional 
j The European experience in the regional economic integration suggests that it has 
a hierarchy from the lowest to a highest-from preferential tracling area (PT A) to 
single currency ancl necls to r巴moveset of barriers at each stage to move to the next 
higher stage. For clεtails， se Samaratllnga， (1999). 
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integration. Trade and other economic policies of a country are 
determined through the interaction of various pressure groups rather than 
purely on welfare considerations (Frey， 1985; Kreinin and Plummer， 
1993). It is well known that international trade has income-distributional 
outcomes that benefit some at the expense of others. Similarly， trade 
restrictions also benefits some groups at the expense of others. For 
example， the Stolper-Samuelson theorem shows that one factor gains 
from protection at the expense of another5. Therefore， pressure groups 
are formed to influence trade policy. 
An RIA means more free trade within， and protection against the rest 
of the world. The surge of RIAs in the recent years is related to the 
inability of many countr凋iesto move unilaterally towards liberalization， 
owing to domestic political constraints. The politics of regional economic 
integration is complex， with conflicts among interest groups within a 
count1'y 01' a 1'egion playing an impo1'tant 1'ole. As usual， impo1't-competing 
indust1'ies lobby fo1' p1'otection， while expo1't-01'iented fi1'ms， and consume1's 
in gene1'al， favour g1'eater f1'ee t1'ade. Some balance has to be kept 
between competing inte1'est g1'oups， and this gives a 1'ole to politics in 
1'egional integ1'ation. 
RIAs may be initially motivated eithe1' by economic 01' political aims. 
But movement f1'om negative integ1'ation (eg. ta1'if bar1'ie1's) to positive 
integ1'ation (eg. establishment of sup1'a-national institutions and 1'emoval 
of ta1'if barrie1's) needs coo1'dinated policy action within the RIA. As 
Haas has pointed out “economic integ1'ation， howeve1' defined， may be 
based on political motives and f1'equently begets political consequences" 
(1964: 12). The expe1'ience of West Eu1'opean integ1'ation is a clea1' 
example (Baldwin， 1993). 
Two levels of t1'ade policies a1'e pointed out by G1'ossman and 
5 For cletailecl cliscusion ancl analysis of the political eco11omy of protectio1， se巴
Vouscl巴1(1990) 
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Helpman (1995); one is at the domestic level and the other is government 
to government at the international level. At the domestic level， the 
government has to deal with special interest groups， and the domestic 
political environment creates constraints on the government's freedom to 
manoeuvre at the international level; on the other hand， international 
interdependence also sets parameters for・domesticpolicy. An RIA may 
be acceptable to a government if it generates substantial gains for the 
majority of the domestic voters and influential special interest groups. 
Hence， the formation of an RIA involves several political economy 
considerations; producers in the R1A that export to the region are a 
potential source of political support; producers who have to compete with 
imports from the region are going to be a potential threat to such 
formations. Richardson (1993) argues that if there is an overall gain 
despite losses incurred by certain sectors， the government may venture to 
support regionalism. 
Multilateral trade liberalization at the globallevel can be considered 
a public good based on cooperative efforts. There is always the potential 
for free-riding in this situation. Unilateralliberalization cannot generate 
more support where domestic groups are not assured of benefits of 
market access. N eoclassical economic theory does not provide a justification 
for choosing regional integration over broader international integration. 
What it shows is that the benefits of integration， for small country are 
more easily obtainable by unilateral reduction (or elimination) of impediments 
to international trade. 1n this context， there is no economic reason or 
incentive to implement policies aimed at preferential integration (Guerrieri 
and Padoan， 1989). If unilateral actions bring more benefits， a valid 
question is: why do countries form R1As? The answer is that such 
formations are often based on non-economic consider割:ionsas well. 
Further， unilateral trade liberalization often leads to domestic conflicts 
and to a halt in the process of liberalization because liberalization is often 
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viewed as a 'concession' to the foreigner， rather than a source of gain to 
the country. 
Economic integration increases economic interdependence among 
countries， and such a situation sometimes leads to conflicts because it 
often has distributional consequences， influencing the region…wide 
allocation of resources and distribution of wealth. Hence， ithas the 
potential for change that could lead to social， political and economic 
conflicts within， and among the members: 
“Behind seemingly technical issues of trade or international money 
lurk significant political issues that profoundly influence the power， 
indepenc1ence， and well being of individual states. Thus， although 
trac1e may well be of mutual benefit， every state wants its own gains 
to benefit clisproportionately to its aclvantage.... to have its say in 
clecision making....." (Gilpin， 1987: 24). 
The political economy aspect of integration is analysed in non…economics 
clisciplines in several ways. According to international political theorists， 
economic integration is a subset of international relations. There are four 
approaches to stucly international relations: (a) state-centric approach; 
(b) firm-centric approach; (c) institutionalist approach; ancl (cl) political 
economy approach (Reecl， 1997). Only one actor， the government is 
recognised as the essential player in international integration in the state 
centric approach. Better political relations are a preconclition for 
economic integration. lt， however， fails to recognise the asymmetry of 
power between states and the importance of the market as a force of 
integration. Further， itfosters the diri以ste(ie. planned) approach to 
integration. 
The importance of firm-centric international integration is the focus 
of the seconcl approach. If clomestic firms coulcl realise economies of 
scale by cooperating regionally， they may opt for regional agreements 
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Firms prefer regional agreements under three conditions (Busch and 
Milner， 1994): (a) where firms are export-dependent; (b) where strong 
multinationality of firms exist; and (c) where the possibility of intra 
-industry trade exists. If these conditions are satisfied， firms will ask 
government to facilitate the regional integration process. Government 
support for such a move depends on the nature of the relationship between 
the firms and the government. 
1n the third approach， the performance of the international institutions 
is the success of international integration. The lack or slow pace of 
integration between two or more countries is the result of the inadequacy 
or the lack of appropriate institutions. However， institutions alone 
cannot bring about international integration， since they cannot be both 
the cause and the effect of integration. 
The political economy approach asserts that neither the state nor the 
firms in isolation can adequately explain economic integration between 
countries. It pays attention to the role of historical structures in international 
integration. Historical structures are a result of the configuration of 
many forces， none of which deter勾minesactions in any direct fashion， but 
that exert pressures and constraints on public policy (Cox， 1981). 
Many current political economy analyses of regional economic integration 
models are Euro-centric. Axline (1979) provided an alternative to the 
Euro-centric integration model， where he emphasised the importance of 
the political context in regional integration among developing countries 
He identifies three regional integration models: the first， the Euro-centric 
1110del creates instability among developing country partners since it 
invariably generates an unequal pattern of exchange and polarisation 
between participants6 • This creates a disequilibriul1， which in turn 
generates instability and disintegration. 1n the second 1110del， these 
6 Neoclassical economic theory provicl巴sthe founclation for the Euro-centric 
integration moclels， ancl economic liberalization is the comer stone. 
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unequal gains and polarisation effects are red1'essed through 1'edistributive 
measures and compensatory schemes. This presumes a highe1' level of 
government commitment to regional integration; hence， this approach 
involves a dirigiste method to integration. The third model goes one step 
fu1'ther to reduce over dependence on one 01' a few members7 • 1n this 
model， economic development issues are addressed entirely at the level of 
domestic and international politics， and incorpo1'ates trade liberalization， 
redistributive and compensatory measures and regional policies to 
combat dependency. It requires more sophisticated institutions with a 
wider scope for decision making， along with a higher level of commitment 
to regional integr抗ion. It has conside1'able appeal， but is difficult to 
implement， and it will take a long time for its 1'esults to be realised. 
Regional agreements can promote free trade to some extent if such 
agreements are programmed to lock into economic reforms (including 
t1'ade reforms). The domestic political constraints on such moves need to 
be countered with possible gains f1勾ombeing a member of R1A. We now 
discuss why South Asian economic integration has been slow and its scope 
fo1' furthe1' integ1'ation. The analysis of this section is 01・ganisedas 
follow日 firstly，the need for regional integration enunciated under 
SAARC is discussed; seconclly， the two phases of 1'egionalism in the 1'egion 
are consiclerecl， followed by an analysis of the aspects of regional political 
characteristics， which largely determine the level， dirモctionand speecl of 
regional integration in South Asia. 
7 Depenclence in this context refers to its historical， functional ancl structural 
manifestations. For cletails se Axline (1979) 
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3. Political Economy Aspects of Regional Integ'ration in 
South Asia 
Need for Regional Integration 
The idea of regional cooperation and integration among South Asian 
countries came with independence8. The desire for some type of regional 
cooperation had been expressed by some countries in the region since 
independence in late 1940s9 • Jawaharlal Nehru， the first Prime Minister 
of independent 1ndia had said (Gupta， 1964) 10: that 
“明Tehave not yet decided what the region of cooperation might be， as 
1 said litle while ago， 1ndia is interested in several regions of Asia. 
Whether al should be grouped together or separately， we do not 
know. That is for us to consider and to decide what is more feasible." 
1n 1976， atthe N on-Aligned Conference summit at Colombo in Sri Lanka， 
N epal expressed the need for regional cooperation among neighbours 
(Upreti， 1986)， but SAARC became a reality only in the 1980s. 
The c1esire for regional cooperation among the countries sprang out 
of diverse reasons. For example， Bangladesh， which proposec1 the present 
regional integration mechanism， wantec1 to elevate the military backed 
government's international anc1 regional credibility following the military 
coup in 1975. Small countries like N epal anc1 Sri Lanka wished to 
8 The term SOllth Asia as a r巴gionitself is of recent origin. For a long time， th巴
present South Asia was considered as a part of South East Asia and later Southern 
Asia (Upreti， 1986). Until recently， Myanmar (formerly Burma) was consid巴redpart 
of SOllth Asia along with the SAARC cOllntries 
9 For example， the Asian Relation Conference held in New Delhi， India in Apri11947， 
the Bagllio Conference in Philippines， in May 1950，日ndthe Colombo Powers 
Conf巴rencein April 1954 expressecl the necl for regional cooperation in SOllth Asia. 
10 Quotecl by Upr巴ti，(1986: 89) from Sisir Gupta's lndia and Regional lntegration in 
Asi，ι 
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counter…balance Indian influence on their domestic and international 
policies. Nepal supported a 1'egional cooperation mechanism with a view 
to minimising Indian influence on Nepal. Bhutan's aim was to elevate its 
international standing f1'om vi1'tual isolation and to counte1'-balance 
excessive Indian influence on domestic and international policies whe1'eas 
Maldives saw economic and political gains de1'iving f1'om the fo1'ul11. 
India's appa1'ent intention was to lead the 1'egion and keep ext1'a-1'egional 
power away f1'om the 1'egion. Pakistan did not wish to have India leading 
othe1' count1'ies in the 1'egion. 
Two Phases of Integration 
The post-independent South Asian 1'egion" expe1'ienced two phases 
of integ1'ation: the first phase， which lasted until the mid 1970s， was 
cha1'acterised by the absence or the lack of enthusiasm for regionalism， 
and the second phase that started in the late 1970s was cha1'acte1'ised by 
an inc1'easing inte1'est in a formal RIA. These two phases 1'eflected some 
impo1'tant 1'egional political realities as well as the changing international 
environment faced by the region. The first phase was marked by the 
legacies of both colonial and p1'e…colonial periods that gave rise to the 
regional instabilities emanating from the India-Pakistan conflict. These 
regional tensions and instabilities acted as a clisintegrating force in the 
region. As elsewhere， South Asian regional conflicts got caught up in the 
cold war politics of the day， and led to both formal and informal ties with 
external powers， the Western bloc ancl the Soviet bloc. Pakistan linkecl 
up with the USA， even becoming a member of the South East Asian 
11 India and Pakistan in 1947 and Sri Lanka in 1948 became indep巴ndentfrom the 
British Imp巴rialpower. Banglad巴shwas East Pakistan befor日 itbecom巴 an
ind巴pendentcountry in 1971. Bhutan， Maldives and N epal had not been British 
coloni巴salthough they had had continuous British Imperial influence until th記巴ndthe 
first half of the 20th century. 
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Treaty Organisation (SEATO)， while India developed close ties with the 
Soviet Union. This aggravated tensions not only between the two countries 
but also created apprehension among others. On the other hand， most of 
the South Asian countries also participated in larger groups: Bangladesh 
(since 1971)， India， Pakistan， and Sri Lanka in the British Commonwealth; 
aI， in the N on-Aligned Movement; Bangladesh and Pakistan in the 
Organisation of Islamic Conference. But these did not involve regional 
economlc cooperatlOn. 
The situation has changed much since the late 1970s. The rapid 
economic growth in the East Asian countries that followed more export 
oriented policies， the rise of RIAs elsewhere including the formation of 
ASEAN -PT A， broader changes in the international consensus on development 
str・ategies，aI influenced South Asian countries to take more interest in 
regionalism， and to look at formal regional arrangements despite continuing 
tensions， particularly between India and Pakistan. 
Political Characteristics 
The political context for r・egionalintegration in the post-independence 
era has been shaped by (a) the colonial experience; (b) nature of the 
post-colonial state; (c) domestic political processes; (d) relations with 
outside powers and regional security and (e) Indo-centricity and bilateral 
disputes in the region. 
Coloniαl Experience 
The region， though it had other Western influences， was overwhelmingly 
dominated by the British since the early 19th century. English became the 
lingua franca of the region， the education and administrative systems 
were fashioned after the British system， British law and jurisprudence 
took root， and the political systems became heavily influenced by British 
concepts， values and norms even though the Westminster style parliamentary 
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democracy proved unworkable for most countries of the region. This 
shared British legacy has been an important positive factor. 
But some of the British legacy has proved to be the source of bitter 
conflict and division as well. The colonial policy of divide and rule that 
ultimately led to the partition of 1mperial 1ndia into 1ndia and Pakistan 
has been the most important and intractable source of regional tensions. 
1n addition， labour migration during the British period created conflicts 
and tensions in the post-independence period that has seen a resurgence 
of nationalism and anti-immigrant feelings among indigenous ethnic 
groups; this， for example， has been an issue in Sri Lanka where large 
numbers of Indian workers were brought in as indentured labor to work 
on British owned plantations. 
The division of Imperial Inclia， into a Hindu majority Inclia ancl a 
Muslim majority Pakistan (itself comprising two culturally and ethnically 
very clifferent units West Pakistan ancl East Pakistan which became 
Banglaclesh after a bloody war in 1971) resulted in the massive‘ethnic 
cleansing' that led to literally millions of dead， and many more millions of 
refugees. From the very inception， the two countries have been at 
loggerheads over territorial disputes and have gone to war several times: 
1947， 1965 and 1971. The conflict flared up again in 1999. Partition 
created a thorny ancl seemingly intractable question over the 'Kashmir 
issue': to which country cloes Kashmir rightfully belong? Kashmir 
remains divided between the two ancl continues to be a major source of 
instability in the region. East Pakistan with India's direct military 
intervention -split from West Pakistan and became the independent state 
of Bangladesh in 1971. The story however， does not end there. The 
mistrust created with partition continues to live with them， ancl figures in 
most economic， political， ancl international relations ancl security issues 
affecting them. Thus， the post-colonial period has been one of continuing 
regional instability: whatever clivisions existed before partition 
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continued， while partition itself created new divisions and perpetuated the 
old 
“The policy of divide and rule， pur・suedby the colonialists (British)， 
exploiting ethnically mixed population in al parts of the sub-continent， 
nay the entire South Asian region， created fertile ground for 
acrimonious relationship between South Asian nations even after 
they gained independence， with serious social implications for al of 
them" (N arain， 1990: 67). 
'Divide and rule' was also visible in Sri Lanka where ther・ewas a 
perception that ethnic minorities (Tamils) and religioL1s minorities 
(Christians) were favoured in some respects over the majority Buddhist 
Sinhalese12• The emergence of Sinhalese nationalism in the post independence 
period， and the development of a Tamil secessionist movement led to 
Indian involvement in the ongoing Sri Lankan conflict， and this has 
strained India-Sri Lanka relations since the early 1980s. 
The movement of labor to other countries particularly from imperial 
India to Sri Lanka， created an inter-state problem after independence. 
This piece of colonial policy brought about internal political instability in 
Sri Lanka on one hand， and intermittent problems in India-Sri Lanka 
relations on the other. The Indian indentur・edlabour was brought to tea， 
rubber and coconut plantations established by the British in the central 
hil regions of the country， that were forcibly acquired from peasants. 
The presence of Indian immigrants in the country was resented even 
during the British administration， and immediately after independence in 
1948， the government disenfranchised the plantation workers of Indian 
origin and rendered them non-citizens of the country， creating a class of 
‘stateless' people whom India refused at fir・stto accept. While subsequent 
negotiations led to a compromise settlement of the issue， residual 
12 About 90 percent of the Sinhalese are Buclclhists. 
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problems and resentments linger. 
1n general， among the sources of current strains on inter…state 
relations in the region， British colonial legacies continue to figure high. 
“Much of the bitterness characterising intra-regional relation is a 
legacy of the colonial past. The deliberate policy of the colonial 
power to sharpen the differences between various social groups on 
the basis of religion and ethnic factors， islargely responsible for the 
ethnic turmoil one witnesses in South Asia" (N ar凋ain，1990: 66). 
Nαture of the Post-Coloniαl Stαte 
Post colonial states of South Asia have had different political experiences: 
India and Sri Lanka continue to have functioning democracies -though 
the democratic system has been severely threatened at times， while 
Bangladesh and Pakistan have alternated between periods of democracy 
and military dominated authoritarian governments. Nepal， though not 
formally colonised， followed basically a similar pattern in terms of being 
strongly British influenced though， inthe political sphere， the monarchy 
successfully resisted democracy until recently“ India has generally 
favoured democratic governments in the region and this has also been a 
source of tension at times (Muni， 1995). However， by early 1990s， al five 
countries had democratic governments and this has been possibly a 
positive factor for regional integration. 
The attitude towards the secular state has been a source of regional 
tensions as well. The Indian constitution is based on the principle of 
secularity in governance. But Pakistan from the beginning has given a 
greater r叫eto Islam in government， and Bangladesh is officially Islamic. 
While Sri Lanka does not call itself a Buddhist state， its constitution gives 
Buddhism a privileged place. N epal is a Hindu kingdom. In addition to 
the role of religion in the state， other internal divisions create problems 
14 
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for nation building. In particular， there are significant religious and 
linguistic minorities in al countries， and there is continuing apprehension 
that these minorities may transfer their allegiances to countries where 
they get more favoured treatment， even though， for example， 1slam 
proved to be an inadequate foundation to maintain an Pakistan undivided 
(Reed， 1997). 
Domestic Politics 
The speed and direction of regional integration is influenced， among 
others， by the degree of political commitment of the participants. 
Political commitment provides the legitimacy and authority to a process 
of regional integration， and ensures the smooth functioning of supr・a-national 
bodies (eg. rモgionalbodies). The extent of authority given to delegates 
and representatives derives from the legitimacy of the incumbent 
governments. The structures and the nature of the polity among the 
participants decide the extent of complementarity of values across the 
region at a broacllevel. The participants at various levels and the elites 
(political， academic， business etc.) are important driving forces for 
regional integration. 
1n the South Asian context， plur叫ityof the polity and the nature of 
the decision making process ensures that a large number of interest 
groups influence public policy， and regional integration policies. These 
include various social groups， classes， local communities， professionals 
and academics， trade unions， women's organisations， religious bodies， 
bureaucracy etc.豆owever，the country's political vision and ideology are 
the major influence on what goals are set， while the style of political 
leadership is the critical factor in making goals operationally viable. 
South Asia now subscr・ibesto representative democratic ideals along with 
an adherence to liberal economic regimes. The stability of SAARC 
decision making is now 1せativelystrong; several changes of government 
「?
in the SAARC region did not cause serious disruptions to the regional 
decision making process13 • 
The SAARC charter excludes any bilateral issues being brought to 
SAARC fora. Further， the focus of regional cooperation is limited to a 
small number of areas. The major disputed issues in the region are more 
bilateral than regional， ancl clearly countries are not committecl to the 
regional process for resolving outstanding issues. Regional stability 
therefore， needs to be ensurecl through bilateral processes. There may 
have been an expectation that integration could be achieved first and 
those bilateral issues woulcl clisappear as the forces of integration got 
strengthenecl. Further， given that SAARC decisions are macle on the basis 
of unanimity， ina region with a wide range of diversity ancl bilateral 
conflicts， only minor changes are brought about in a small number of 
areas. 
Outside Powers αnd Regionα1 Security 
South Asian economic integration， just like peace， security and 
development in the region， isgovernecl largely by the dynamics of a 
mixture of global imperatives， clomestic pressures， inter-state constraints， 
ancl regional perspective ancl outlook. Post…colonial South Asia facecl 
certain adverse international influences that shaped not only the nature of 
intra-regional integration bout also its relations with the rest of the worlcl 
cluring that per・iod. There are three major influences: (a) cold war 
1討alries，(b) the Sino-Indian border dispute， anc1 (c) the new forces of 
religious fundamentalism. 
As earlier mentioned， al these countries， except Nepal， have been 
members of the Commonwealth， and al are members of the N on-Aligned 
13 Even after the nuclear tests in lndia and Pakistan， the 1998 SAARC summit was not 
disrupt巴dbut was held in Colombo， Sri Lanka， and was attended by leaders of al 
South Asian countries. 
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Movement (NAM). The Commonwealth was a legacy of Britsh colonialism， 
whereas N AM was the result of efforts made to unite developing 
countries in the post-colonial international setting. Inc1ia and Sri Lanka 
were active in developing NAM， while others in the region joinec1 it 
though during the colc1 war era. However， the countries in the region 
tenc1ed to lean towarc1s one or the other of the major power blocs. Big 
powers had important interests in the region. US wantec1 the region to 
curb Chinese influence ever since Tibet was taken over by China in 1951， 
as well as to contain Soviet influence. The Soviet concern was to curb 
American influence， while making alliances in the region against China. 
Their strategic behaviour in anc1 economic assistance to the region were 
designec1 accorc1ingly. Thus， Inc1ia had close relations with the Soviet 
Union， while Pakistan hac1 close links with US. Other countries c1ic1 not 
have a clear pattern of affiliation. For example， inSri Lanka， when the 
right of centre party (ie. Unitec1 National Party UNP) was in power， 
it tenc1ec1 to be closer to the West， whereas the centre-left， SLFP (Sri 
Lanka Freec10m Party) leanec1 towarc1s the Soviet Bloc. Nepal hac1 to 
balance between Inc1ia anc1 China. Banglac1esh was not greatly affectec1 by 
colc1 war rivalry， but in the early years it preferrec1 to lean towarc1s the 
Soviet Bloc. The relationships with the great powers hinc1erec1 initiatives 
towarc1s regional integration. The links with outsic1e powers were also 
relatec1 to the asymmetric military anc1 political power exercisec1 by Inc1ia 
in the region. In this situation， Pakistan continues to seek parity with 
Inc1ia anc1 attempts to achieve that through external military anc1 
economic assistance. The smaller countries in the region too continue to 
fear Inc1ian c1ominance. Therefore， 
"they wish to counter balance the Inc1ian giant， even while forging 
cooperation with it. Anc1 far from trying to keep the worlc1 powers 
out of the 1・egion，the urge is to get them involvec1 in the region. As 
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for 1ndia， itis apprehensive of its security being underl11ined in what 
it considers to be its strategic perimeter" (Narayanan， 1995: 4) 
The second il11portant contentious issue has been the region's 
relations with China (PRC). Until the border尚 warbetween 1ndia and 
China erupted in 1962， this had not been a question of importance frol11 a 
regional integration perspective， but since then tensions have become a 
factor in the region's inter-state relations. After 1ndia grantec1 refugee 
status to the Tibetan leader， the Dalai Lama in 1959， relations 
deteriorated between China anc1 1ndia. With the border conflict of 1962， 
Pakistan c1eveloped closer relations with China. This had a spillover 
effect on other凋 countriesas 1ndia did not wish others to get close to China. 
The country most affected in this case was Nepal， which is land locked 
between 1ndia and China. 1ndia consic1ered the N epal…China bOl・deras its 
outer border with respect to its external security as in the til11e of British 
il11perial 1ndia， and treated any Chinese relations with Nepal with 
suspicion anc1 apprehension. 
The thirc1 extra-regional influence is of relatively recent origin 
c1uring the 1990s. This is the rise of 1slamic religious func1amentalisl11. Its 
nature ancl extent of influence on regional integration is yet be c1etermined， 
but it coulc1 have a considerable negative effect on South Asian regional 
integration if it becomes a major force. 
lndo…Centricityαnd Bilαter，αl Disputes 
1ndia is at the centre of the region in several ways. All other South 
Asian countries are locatec1 arounc1 1nclia， anc1 every country has either a 
land or a sea border with it. Further， Bangladesh， 1ndia and Pakistan 
were a single entity half a century ago. 1n terms of many other attributes 
such as physical size and population， economic and defence power， 1ndia's 
prominence is unchallengeable. Therefore， the South Asian region can be 
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considered 'Indo-centric'14. 
While the Indo-centric nature of South Asia could be a catalyst for 
regional integration， itcan also hamper it. As mentioned earlier， the most 
serious bilateral disputes are with India. They vary in their intensity. 
India's relations with her neighbours have， accordingly， been characterised 
as being‘perpetually adversarial' (in the case of Pakistan) or irritable 
(with regards to Bangladesh and Sri Lanka) or on a line of ‘fluctuating 
friendship' (with Nepal) 15 (Sahadevan， 1992: 16). 
lndia-Bangladesh relations had been relatively free of problems 
until the mid-1970s with the issue of sharing the water from the Ganges 
river as the only important bilateral issue. But with the military COUp in 
1975， relations deteriorated， and worsened when tribal insurgents from 
the Chittagong Hill Tract region of Bangladesh demanding greater 
autonomy， started to operate from bases in India. Further， India was 
concer・nedabout the US involvement in Bangladesh with substantial 
econol11ic aid， ostensibly to curb the Soviet threat (Ahmed， 1983). But 
with the replacel11ent of military rule with a del110cratically elected 
civilian government in the mid-1990s， relations warl11ed again， and the 
water sharing issue was resolvecl in 1998. The Banglaclesh government 
also took steps in 1998 to resolve the Chittagong Hill Tract problem 
associatecl with the issue of regional autonomy for the tribal groups， ancl 
this too has removecl a source of potential friction. 
Despite the fact that there are no outstancling political issues creating 
tensions， the fear that liberalization will hurt clomestic inclustries that will 
face cheaper Indian il11ports provicles the basis for consiclerable resistance 
to further liberalization with Inclia， ancl fears of an Inclian cultural 
'4 Further， many countries in the region trace their ethnic， r巴ligious，linguistic and 
other cultural roots to India. 
日 India'srelations with Bhutan and iVIaldiv巴shave b巴巴n'cordial' (Sahadevan， 192). 
? ?
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invasion are also raised in these campaigns. 1n fact， these political 
economy configurations had an adverse impact on trade policy liberalization 
on a preferential basis between 1ndia and Bangladesh 
lndia-N epal relations and the integration of N epal into the rest of 
the world have been shaped by its location， historical legacies， and 
superpower involvement in the region. As mentioned earlier， Nepal 
though directly not a British colony was under British contropG and Nepal 
was politically subservient to India in the colonial period. On the other 
hand， historically， N epal has had close economic and religious links with 
Tibet. After the Chinese assumed suzerainty in T泌氏 in1950， and 
particularly after 1959， Nepal became the home for a large number of 
Tibetan refugees. Caught between two giants India and China -N epal 
has tried to maintain a policy of equi-distance between them. However， 
after 1950， N epal moved closer to 1ndia (Majumdar， 1978). However， 
after the Inc1o-Chinese border凋 conflictin 1962， N epaHndia relations 
became very sensitive for a period. 
じntilthe 1980s， N epal c1epenc1ed almost completely on 1nc1ia for 
investment and trac1e. However， itwantec1 to rec1uce its traditional 
clepenc1ence on tracle anc1 investment from India， ancl to c1iversify its tracle 
and investment links with the other countries in the regiOlP. Further， it
has tried to balance on trac1e and investment links with China anc1 Inc1ia 
lG 1n 1923. Britain ancl Nepal signecl a Treaty of Frienclship. Th巴Iヨritishtreatecl both 
Nepal ancl Tibct as being uncler their exclusive sphere of influence. though not openly 
cleclar巴clas such. Furth巴r，the British clicl not like both the Soviet ancl Chinese 
influencc in the region. 1n the 1923 Treaty， the British recognisecl Nepal's cxternal 
ancl int巴rnalinclepenclence (Majumdar， 1990). 
17 Nepal has been trying to diversify its trad巴andinvestment relations as well as 
other 1・elationboth within and outside the South Asian region sinc巴thelate 1970s. For 
example， Nepal signed a Trade and Transit Agreement with Bangladesh in 1976， 
although the countries ar巴notcontiguous. 
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Yet N epal's aims of being strictly inclependent in external relations， while 
maintaining open borclers with Inclia have proved to be incompatible， 
because it also wantecl to be given prefer官 ltialtreatment by Inclia in trade 
and investment (Kant， 1977). Moreover， Nepal has to depend on India for 
its development since its transit routes are through India， ancl 
clevelopment of tracle with the external world is depenclent on the good 
will of India (Upreti， 1986). 
Nepal's attempt to reduce dependence on India， and its warmer 
relations with China were resentecl by India， ancl brought the region's 
super…power rivalries into Nepal. Immediately after China's establishment 
of its suzerainty over Tibet， Nepal signed an economic cooperation 
agreement with USA18. American economic assistance to Nepal was 
clevelopment一orienteclalthough it was clescribecl as reflecting its political 
ancl strategic motives in the region. The Unitecl States ancl Inclia were the 
first providers of aicl to N epal in the early 1950s ancl then came China ancl 
Soviet Union. The aim of aicl proviclecl by each of them was clifferent. 
The US aimecl to check the intrusion of communism into the Himalayas， 
the Soviets aimed at tr命ansforminga backwarcl economy in orcler to 
recluce its clepenclence on imperial powers， while China ancl Inclia 
competecl with each other for influence. With the icleological clifference 
emerging between the Soviet Union ancl China by the encl of the 1950s， the 
Soviet Union changecl its aim to that of clispelling Chinese influence from 
Nepal. China too proviclecl economic assistance to maintain its political 
ancl str‘ategic aims， ancl a large part of its economic assistance went to the 
clevelopment of roacls， with a view to clevelop a roacl link to the Chinese 
18 The Point Four GeneraJ Agreem日ntfor Economic Cooperation between N巴paJand 
the United States was signed on January 23， 1951. This agr巴ement，with eventuaJ 
changes， provides the basis for continu巴d日conomica部istanceto N epal from the 
United States. US economic cooperation with Nepal should not be described as 
d巴terminedsolely by political and strategic considerations. It also has a welfare 
cOlsideratiol for the N巴palese(犯aidya，1983). 
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border， and to projects which were considered by India to be inimical to 
their interests (Dharamdasani， 1973) 19. Indian aid to Nepal was motivated 
by a more complex set of factors， involving political， strategic， economic 
and cultural dimensions. India always felt and stated that Nepallies on 
its northern border of security. Nepal's thousand mile border with Tibet 
is seen as critical to India's security interests vis-α-vis China. It was 
hoped that Nepal would not readily accept economic assistance from 
elsewhere， particularly from China. India began its economic aid to 
Nepal in 1950 and， as described above， was forced to compete with others 
for influence in subsequent decades. Indian motives for economic 
assistance have always been suspect to the Nepalese as being a strategy 
for dominance (Dharamdasini， 1973). On the other hand， Nepal's desire 
to have more diversified trade and investment links with countr匂sother 
than India has always been treated with suspicion in India. Relations 
cooled so much during the 1980s that in 1989 they virtually came to a 
stand stil over the transit issue in which transit routes were closed by 
19 Trad巴 withChina has been carried out under agreements (巴arIierwith Tibet) 
Under the agreement with China in 1981 inhabitants within 30 kilometers of eith巴rside 
of the bord日rare allowed to trad日andmove freely. By participation in d巴V巴lopm日nt
activities， China wanted to r巴duceth日influenceof oth巴rpow巴rs，particularly that of 
the Indians， but also of the Russians and Americans. 
201、radeand transit relationships with India are of immensely important to th日
巴xter・naltrad巴ofN epal (Adhil王ari，1988). Th巴n巴arestseaport available for trade 
with a third country is Caicutta， India，呂ndit is 800 k.m. away from the eastern border 
of N巴pal. Chittagong， Bangladesh has become an alternative port for Nepal since 
1978， but is associated with poor iηfrastructur巴andproblems of an administrative 
nature， and ther日for巴， is not frequently used. Th巴earlytrade treaties in 1950 and 1960 
b巴tw巴enIndia and N巴palaim巴dat the goal of a common market betw巴enth巴m
(Adhikari， 1988). In the earlier treaties (1950 and 1960) Nepal had to be in line with 
Indian external tarif policy (so as to conform to a CET) to avoid trade deflection 
through N日pal. Th巴 Tr巴atyof Trade， Treaty of Transit， and Agreement of 
Cooperation to Control Unauthorised Trade signed in 1978 between Nepal and India 
cam巴toan end in 1989， and was replaced by n巴wtr巴atieson trade and transit. 
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India for months continuously20. But India and Nepal always had open 
bor・dersfor trade between them. 
As would be clear already， Indo-Pakistan disputes have been the 
most vexing problem for regional cooperation in South Asia. In fact， al 
South Asian cooperation pivots on Indo-Pakistan relations21. Whenever 
diplomatic relations between the two countries came to a halt for several 
years as in the 1970s， cooperation towards growing economic integration 
was out of the question. 
The bitterness of partition， unsettled territorial issues， particularly 
Kashmir， the frequent military rule in Pakistan (for nearly half of 
Pakistan's history， the country has been under military rule) 2， and the 
relationships with great powers have al complicated and aggravated 
tensions between these two countries. Pakistan， seeing India as a military 
thr・eat，has always attempted to achieve parity in military capacity. This 
ran parallel to US interests in the region during the 1950s， and led 
Pakistan to conclude the Mutual Defence Pact with US in 1954 that drew 
it into military-defense alliances -the South East Treaty Organisation 
(SEATO) and the Central Treaty Organisation (CENTO) 23. A Bilateral 
Cooperation Agreement between US and Pakistan signed in 1959 also 
covered many areas of cooperation， including military matters. After the 
India-China war of 1962， China saw in Pakistan a natural ally， and this led 
to closer Pakistan-China relations in many fields including nuclear 
21“It is unfortunate but true that SAARC isa hostage to Indian-Pakistan hostility. ln 
th巴ultimateanalysis it is th巴Indo-Pakistanrelationship on which the viability of 
SAARC depends" (Upadhyaya， 193: 13) 
2 The military was in power from 1958…1971 and from 1977-1989‘ For other periods 
since 1947， itwas under civilian rule， although the country's polici巴sin g巴neralw巴re
defined巴xplicitlyby the military 
23 Pakistan joined the U.S. led Bagdacl Pact known as CENTO (Central Treaty 
Organisationl in April 1954 and the South East Asia Treaty Organization (SEA TO) 
in Sept巴mber，1956
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technology24. The situation was further complicated when India concluded 
a friendship treaty with the Soviet Union in 1971. Tensions between the 
two countries escalated in 1971， when India intervened to enable East 
Pakistan to secede and found Bangladesh. 
The creation of Bangladesh was a strategic defeat for Pakistan， and 
resulted in another arms race in the sub-continent， this time extending to 
the nuclear arena. India had demonstrated its nuclear capabilities in 1974， 
and Pakistan seized the opportunity to advance its own nuclear agenda 
when Soviet involvement in Afghanistan led to direct US support for the 
anti-Soviet forces in Afghanistan， support that was channeled through 
Pakistan25. This provided room for Pakistan to develop its own nuclear 
capability. Hence both countries exploded nuclear devices in the 
mid-1998. 
India-Sri Lanka relations in general were relatively tr渇anquiluntil 
the early 1980s， despite the issue of citizenship for the 'stateless' workers 
of Indian origin in Sri Lanka. But Sri Lanka has been often wary of India' 
s hegemonic moves in the region， and has cultivated good relations with 
24 Pakistan signed a formal trad巴agr巴巴mentwith China in 1963 followed by many 
oth巴ragreements to promote trade and investment between the two countries. USA 
resented th巴growthand nature of Sino円Pakistanrelationships， and this resulted in th巴
decline of US foreign aid to Pakistan since the mid 1960s. (Bhola， 1984). 
25 Pakistan moved to for・m the Economic Cooperation Organisation (ECO) in 
February 1992 with an obj巴ctiveof facilitating economic coor】巴rationamong its 
members. Its members are Pakistan， Iran， Turk巴y，Azerbaijan， Kazakhstan， 
Turkmenistan， Tajikistan， Uzbekistan and Kirgistan. Pakistan view巴dthat th巴
growth of SAARC coop巴rationwiJ lead to enhanc巴India'sdominance in the region 
in a differ巴ntfashion. H巴nce，its participation in ECO amounts to enhance its stancling 
in th巴SouthAsian region 
26 Economic cOOp巴rationbetwe巴nChina ancl Sri Lanka began， inmoclem tim巴s，with 
the signing of the Rubber-Rice Agr巴em巴ntbetwe日nthem in 1952. Further， Sri Lanka 
never openly took a position on th巴Tibetanissue， which brought China closer to Sri 
Lanka at a political level 
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both Pakistan and China26. The Indian government resented the 
pro-western ti1t of the Sri Lankan government in the post-1977 period， 
together with its increasing closeness to Pakistan and China， and 
intervened to support the secessionist Tami1 militants in Sri Lanka in the 
ear1y 1980s， which a1so enab1ed it to appease the Tami1 constituency in 
South India， who sympathised with the Sri Lankan Tami1 strugg1e. Sri 
Lanka was re1uctant1y forced to accept Indian military intervention in 
1987， which 1asted unti1 ear・1y1990， when Indian troops were forced to 
1eave by their inabi1ity to subdue the Tami1 separatists as they had 
p1anned. But the big-brother image of India was reinforced by this 
action， and it has 1eft a 1asting 1egacy of suspicion about Indian motives 
and 10ng-term strategies. This perioc1 of po1itica1 tension was a1so 
mar・kedby a very 10w 1eve1 of trade between the two countries， which 
reached its 10west 1eve1 in 1987. Since then trade has gradually improved， 
but the fact that the trade ba1ance has a1ways been in favour of India， and 
the higher 1eve1s of protection in India continue to be a source of 
uneasiness. A p1an for a bi1atera1 reduction of trade barriers between the 
two countries was announced in December， 1998， but 1ater fa1tered when 
it came to negotiations about the detai1s -to a 1arge extent ref1ecting the 
apprehensions about Indian dominance in Sri Lankan society， which was 
exp10ited by protectionist groups in both countries27 • 
There have not been any significant bi1atera1 disputes invo1ving other 
countries in the group considered here， though Bang1ac1esh-Pakistan 
re1ations were frosty in the immediate aftermath of the founc1ing of 
Bang1adesh， and there is an unreso1vec1 dispute between Bhutan and 
N epa1 regarding refugees. 
27 In April， 2000 both countries finalizecl th巴NegativeLists ancl macle th巴agreement
operational. However， ther巴havebeen sev巴ralpoints of clisagre日mentsabout the 
operational aspects of the agreem日nt.
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4. Regionalism: A Strategy for South Asian Development 
The complex patterns of regional relationships， ongoing regional 
political disputes， and apprehension about India's dominant position in 
both political and economic terms have constrained attempts to develop 
greater cooperation to enhance regional economic integration. Although 
SAARC was established in 1985， progress towards greater regional 
integration has been very slow. Further， the limited nature of integration 
sought reflects how difficult integration in South Asia iS28 • 
SAARC focussed mainly on non-economic matters， and has kept 
bilateral issues out of the SAARC process. Although SAPT A has notified 
to WTO its intentions to operate as a PT A， inline with the statutory 
requirements， itcarries litle economic or political significance yet. But 
it is possible to discern a slow， but steady move towards greater 
cooperation， and if a solution were found to the Indo…Pakistan dispute， 
therで ispotential to move towards greater regional integration. The very 
existence of SAARC and the related agreements， the regular meetings of 
heads of government and bureaucrats that generate increased interaction 
at various levels among countries， and the absence of a legacy of a bad 
experience of being in a regional group， are positive aspects of the 
situation. The possibility that pro-regional integration forces can become 
stronger should not be ruled out; if that were to occur， itwill be a catalyst 
for further liberalization and closer cooperation， moving along a dynamic 
path of regional economic integration. 
The success or failure of South Asian cooperation rests largely on 
India. Earlier India was of the view that it was not in her interests to 
move forward with regional economic integration efforts， but in the 
post…cold war setting， with new economic and political realities and 
having changed its own economic policy 
28 For details se Samaratunga (1999). 
India has been 
? ? ??
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taking the initiative to achieve progress towards increased intra-regional 
trade. Despite the political constraints， neighbours also realise that the 
size of the Indian economy and its growth performance， can provide 
potential opportunities for greater beneficial economic transactions. In 
fact， the higher internal transport costs offer opportunities for beneficial 
trade with neighbouring countries (already exploited to some extent by 
illegal/ nrecorded trade29 - if trade barriers were to come down. For 
example， transport costs would be much lower・ fortrade between 
Pakistan and the north western Indian states like Gujarat， Rajasthan， and 
Punjab， between Bangladesh and eastern and north eastern Indian states 
like West Bengal， Orissa， Assam， Tripura， Manipur and， and between Sri 
Lanka and southern Indian states like， Kerala， Kamataka， Tamilnadu， 
Andra Pradesh. 
However， such an increase in trade depends largely on the trade 
complementarities between them， and relative transport costs. Indeed 
some of the trade complementarities that exist are not at present 
reflectec1 in actual trac1e. Thus it is known that much potential exists for 
trac1e between Pakistan anc1 Inc1ia in the energy (electricity) sector， and 
unexploited opportunities also exist for complementarities in the area of 
environmental cooperation such as lanc1 conservation， flood anc1 
drainage control areas in north west Inc1ia anc1 Pakistan. Given these 
conditions， SAARC countries could develop a three-pronged mode of 
economic integration: 
(a) The first moc1e of integration which is now unc1er way (ie. SAPTA) 
in which al participate as a group in one preferential agreement. 
29 Estimates of unrecord巴dtrade in the region are al but 'guesstimates' and vary 
wiclely -between India and Bangladesh it is considered around one half of the value 
of recorded bilateral trade at present; betw巴巴nIndia and Pakistan it coulcl range any 
where betwe巴ntwo to five times the recorded trade at a given time. Th巴rεisno 
significant unr日cordecltracle betw巴巴nIndia and N巴pal，and Inclia and Sri Lanka， at
present. 
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(b) The second mode of integr・ationinvolving the four countries (ie. 
Bangladesh， Pakistan， N epal and Sri Lanka) to negotiate bilateral 
preferential agreements with India30 • 
(c) The third mode of integration involves the four命 countries (ie. 
Bangladesh， Pakistan， N epal and Sri Lanka) negotiating bilateral 
preferential agreements with each other31 
The three modes could be complementary to each other. The first 
mode of integration is a more difficult option given the problems of 
political economy overhanging the region and SAARC's condition of a 
unanimous decision being necessary for region wide integration 
arrangements. The second mocle of integration obviously is not unifor・n1，
ancl could lead to undermine the region-wide efforts at cooperation and 
integration. If bilateral relations at a political level were cordial， such 
agreements could exceed the level of integration that is feasible under 
SAARC. It is possible for other countr匂sin the region also to learn from 
the lessons of the exper匂nceof lndia -Nepal integration over the years.32 
But the difficulties of negotiating and making operational such 
agreements should not be understated. However， lndia has accorded 
importance to the second mode of integration， given the political 
configuration at present in the region. Other countries in the region are 
beginning to aUach importance to bilateral preferential tracle agreements 
with each other. However， given the speecl of trade liberalization taking 
30 Sri Lanka ancl Inclia concluclecl a bilateral free tracle agreem巴ntin December 1998 
and macle it operational in April 2000. Nepal ancl India signecl a fr巴巴tradeagr巴em巴nt
in 1960 ancl moclifi巴CIit sev巴raltimes sinc巴then(Karmacharya， 20(1). Bhutan ancl 
Malclives also coulcl each sign bilateral preferential tracle agr巴巴mentswith Inclia. 
31 Sri Lanka ancl Pakistan are engagecl in preliminary works towar・c1sa preferential 
tracl巴 agreementat present. Bhutan ancl Maldives too coulcl exchange bilateral 
preferential tracle agr巴巴m日ntwith them ancl巴achother， although practicality of sl1ch 
agreem巴ntsis questionable. 
32 Inclia has already signed two bilateral free tracl巴 agreements(apart from with 
Nepal) with Bhutan ancl Sri Lanka. 
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place under the WTO initiative on a global basis， preferential trade in the 
region requires a deeper cut in preferences in whatever the chosen mode 
may be. 
5. Concluding Rernarks 
The formal cooperation needed to achieve greater regional integration 
requires political will and commitment on the part of governments. 1n 
turn， this generally requires a conducive domestic political environment. 
Of course， itwill always be the case that some import competing sectors 
will not favour any kind of integration arrangement that reduces import 
prices， while consumers and exporting sectors are likely to favour more 
openness. But the anti…integration forces can dominate if there are other 
factors that strengthen the resistance to integration with neighbours. 1n 
South Asia， such factors are found in abundance. 
The process of regional integration in South Asia has lacked any 
formal mechanism of cooperation mechanism until recently. Even now， 
there are many forces that hinder further progress in this direction. 
While the shared colonial history of the region can have both positive 
(pro-integration) and negative (anti…integration) impacts at the political 
level， many of the political constraints that generate 'disintegrative' 
dynamics and hinder progress towards greater integration are rooted in 
that legacy. 1n addition， domestic political issues， cold war related 
security and political disputes， bilateral disputes with 1ndia and the fear 
of its dominant position， together with a complex mixture of ethnic， 
religious， and language problems have drastically slowed down the 
process of integration. This is illustrated vividly in the case of the recent 
failed attempt at its very inception to implement a bilateral preferential 
trade agreement between 1ndia and Sri Lanka. 
A greater regional integration in South Asia could be achieved if 
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countries in the region are ready to move with 1ndia and with each other 
on a preferential basis to circumvent the exiting and potential political 
constraints overhanging the region. These modes of integration could be 
a potential strategy for greater regional integration and development of 
the region compared with benefits that could be had in the process of 
region-wide preferential agreements like SAPT A. 1n any case the region 
has to provide deeper cuts in preferential trade given the extent and depth 
of trade liberalization taking place elsewhere in the world. 
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